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Enterprise wide area network (WAN) is a private network that connects the com-
puters and other devices across an organisation’s branch locations and the data
centers. It forms the backbone of enterprise communication. Currently, multi-
protocol label switching (MPLS) is commonly used to provide this service. As
a recent alternative to MPLS, software-defined wide area networking (SD-WAN)
solutions are being introduced as an IP based cloud-networking service for en-
terprises. SD-WAN virtualizes the networking service and eases the complexity
of configuring and managing the enterprise network by moving these tasks to
software and a central controller. The introduction of new technologies causes
concerns about their security. Also, this new solution is introduced as a replace-
ment for MPLS, which has been considered secure and has been in use for more
than 16 years. Thus, there is a need to analyze the security of SD-WAN, which
is the goal of this thesis.
In this thesis, we perform a security analysis of a commercial SD-WAN solu-
tion, by finding its various attack surfaces, associated vulnerabilities and design
weaknesses. We choose Nuage VNS, an SD-WAN product provided by Nuage
Networks, as the analysis target. As a result, many attack surfaces and secu-
rity weaknesses were found and reported, especially in the Customer Premises
Equipment (CPE). In particular, we found vulnerabilities in the CPE’s secure
bootstrapping method and demonstrated some attacks by exploiting them. Fi-
nally, we propose mitigation steps to avoid the attacks.
The results of this thesis will help both the service provider and the SD-WAN
solution vendor to know about the attack surfaces and weaknesses of SD-WAN
before offering it to their customers. We also help in implementing the temporary
countermeasures to mitigate the attacks. The results have been presented to the
service provider and the vendor of the SD-WAN product.
Keywords: SD-WAN, Nuage VNS, virtual network functions, security
analysis, VXLAN, SDN overlay, man-in-the-middle attack,
API access control
Language: English
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Enterprise wide area network (WAN) a¨r ett privat na¨tverk som fo¨rbinder datorer
och andra enheter o¨ver en organisations gren platser och datacenter. Den utgo¨r
ryggraden i fo¨retagets kommunikation. Fo¨r na¨rvarande a¨r Multiprotocol Label
Switching (MPLS) anva¨nds ofta fo¨r att tillhandah˚alla denna tja¨nst. Som en ny
alternativ till MPLS, mjukvarudefinierad wide area na¨tverk (SD-WAN) lo¨sningar
info¨rs som en IP-baserad molnna¨tverkstja¨nst fo¨r fo¨retag. SD-WAN virtualise-
rar den na¨tverkstja¨nst och underla¨ttar komplexiteten i konfigurera och hantera
fo¨retagets na¨tverk genom att flytta dessa uppgifter till programvara och en cen-
tral styrenhet. Info¨randet av ny teknik medfo¨r oro om deras sa¨kerhet. Dessutom
a¨r den nya lo¨sningen info¨rdes som en ersa¨ttning fo¨r MPLS, som har ansetts sa¨ker
och har anva¨nts i mer a¨n 16 a˚r. Det finns s˚aledes ett behov av att analysera
sa¨kerheten i SD-WAN, vilket a¨r ma˚let med denna avhandling.
I denna avhandling vi utfo¨r en sa¨kerhetsanalys av ett kommersiellt SD-WAN-
lo¨sning, genom att hitta de olika attackytor tillho¨rande s˚arbarheter och svagheter
konstruktions. Vi va¨ljer Nuage VNS, en SD-WAN produkt fr˚an Nuage Networks,
eftersom analysen m˚al. Som ett resultat, blev ma˚nga attackytor och svagheter
i sa¨kerheten och rapporteras, sa¨rskilt i Customer Premises Equipment (CPE).
Framfo¨r allt har vi hittat s˚arbarheter i CPE sa¨kra bootstrapping metod och
visade vissa attacker genom att utnyttja dem. Slutligen fo¨resl˚ar vi begra¨nsnings
a˚tga¨rder fo¨r att undvika attacker.
Resultatet av denna avhandling kommer att hja¨lpa b˚ade tja¨nsteleveranto¨ren och
SD-WAN-lo¨sning leveranto¨r fo¨r att veta om de attackytor och svagheter i SD-
WAN innan erbjuda det till sina kunder. Vi hja¨lper ocks˚a att genomfo¨ra de
tillfa¨lliga mot˚atga¨rder fo¨r att mildra attackerna. Resultaten har presenterats fo¨r
tja¨nsteleveranto¨ren och leveranto¨ren av SD-WAN produkt.
Nyckelord: SD-WAN, Nuage VNS, virtuella na¨tverksfunktioner,
sa¨kerhetsanalys, VXLAN, SDN overlay, man-in- the-middle
attack, API a˚tkomstkontroll
Spra¨k: Engelska
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SD-WAN Software Defined Wide Area Network
SDN Software Defined Networking
NFV Network Function Virtualisation
NV Network virtualisation
VNS Virtualised Networking Services
VXLAN Virtual Extensible Local Area Network
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching
CPE Customer Premises Equipment
VPN Virtual Private Network
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
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NSG Network Services Gateway
VSC Virtualized Services Controller
VSD Virtualized Services Directory
VSP Virtualized Services Platform
DNS Domain Name System
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
XMPP Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
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MP-BGP Multiprotocol Border Gateway Protocol
SMS Short Message Service
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
OF-TLS OpenFlow over Transport Layer Security
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol secure
XML Extensible Markup Language
SSH Secure Shell
TLS Transport Layer Security
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
TEK Traffic Encryption Key
NTP Network Time Protocol
SEK Seed Encryption Key
AES CBC Advanced Encryption Standard cipher block chaining
HMAC Hash-based message authentication codes
GUI Graphical User Interface
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
SS7 Signalling System No. 7
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
CSR Certificate signing request
MITM Man-in-the-middle
DOS Denial of Service
TPM Trusted Platform Module
EK Endorsement Key
SRK Storage Root Key
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm 1
RSA Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman Algo-
rithm
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
UID Unique Identification Number
XMPP-TLS Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol over
Transport Layer Security
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Enterprise networks form the backbone of everyday communication that con-
nect computers and other devices across different company branches includ-
ing data centers. These networks allow users and devices in the enterprise
network to share data in a secure way. Such enterprise networks may include
Wide Area Networks (WAN) and Local Area Networks (LAN), depending on
the organization structure and operational requirements. In the early days,
point-to-point leased lines were used to provide enterprise network solutions
with dedicated DS0 and T1/E1 or T3/E3 connections [10]. In the 90s, this
was replaced by the less expensive frame relay service, which required fewer
physical connections. Thus, this technology was widely accepted by many
enterprises including banks. MPLS is the successor to the frame relay service.
It was designed as an IP based solution to use the infrastructure of a telecom
network. Hence, telecom service providers prefer the MPLS based solution
over the frame relay service to offer for their customers. For instance, Son-
era, a leading telecom operator in Finland, currently offers an MPLS solution
called as Sonera Datanet, and it is a market leader in Finland.
In spite of having been adopted by many enterprises, MPLS has its draw-
backs in terms of cost and bandwidth. MPLS connections remain expensive
and offer low bandwith compared to the public internet. Moreover, the in-
troduction of technologies such as IPsec VPN allows sharing of enterprise
data over the public internet in a secure way. Considering the above fac-
tors, enterprises started to look for alternative solutions to MPLS. On the
other hand, service providers also face problems in providing MPLS to the
new generation enterprises which have started to rely on public clouds for
their infrastructure. MPLS has problems in connecting the enterprise branch
sites to the public clouds operated in third-party data centers. Due to this
business shift, Sonera has started to see a decline in revenue in its MPLS
business recently. Consequently, there is a need for both enterprises and
9
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service providers to look for a new solution.
The Software Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN) solution is intro-
duced as a new generation of enterprise networking in order to overcome the
above mentioned problems. SD-WAN is an internet and SDN based, cloud-
networking service offered to the enterprises. It virtualizes the networking
service and eases the complexity of configuring and managing the enterprise
networks.
The introduction of new technologies causes concerns about the under-
lying security model and robustness of the new product implementations.
Also, this new solution is introduced as a replacement for MPLS, which has
been considered secure and has been in use for more than 16 years, despite
many targeted attacks1. This makes it a necessity to analyze the security
of the SD-WAN architecture and products before wide scale deployment.
This thesis is about studying the security model of SD-WAN by performing
an in-depth analysis of a commercial SD-WAN product called Nuage VNS
offered by Nuage Networks. Following a responsible disclosure process, we
have reported all discovered vulnerabilities to Nuage Networks. The vendor
has responded in a very constructive way, and we expect the issues to be
solved. This work has been carried out at Sonera, Finland, as part of Busi-
ness Defined Networking team, which offers SD-WAN solution to Finnish
enterprises.
Research problem
Our goal is to perform thorough security analysis of a SD-WAN solution,
which includes finding its various attack surfaces, associated vulnerabilities
and design weaknesses and then demonstrate attacks that exploit found weak-
nesses. The ultimate goal is to propose solutions and mitigation steps to
avoid any attacks. We aim to achieve the following things:
1. Understand the architecture and operations of a SD-WAN solution in
order to perform security analysis on it.
2. Identify the attack surfaces and security weaknesses in that solution.
3. Demonstrate attacks based on the found weaknesses and evaluate the
significance and criticality of each attack.
4. Find possible solutions, mitigation steps and propose design changes
to improve the security of the SD-WAN solution.
1https://securityintelligence.com/enterprise-attack-it-security-need-risk-based-layered-
security-strategy-defend/
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Research methods
We theoretically analyze the security requirements of SD-WAN solution based
on the white paper [27], released by ONUS SD-WAN working group. Then,
we conduct a case study by taking one SD-WAN product available on the
market. Subsequently, in-depth testing is carried out on that solution to con-
firm that the solution meets the security requirements. In the course of our
testing, we implement many attacks based on the weaknesses found in the
analysis. This thesis uses a case study approach where a particular person,
situation or solution is studied in order to understand a principle in general
[35]. Thus, we study and analyze Nuage VNS security in detail in order to
understand SD-WANs security in general. Moreover, in security research it
is common to focus on attacks in order to understand the threats against
new technology and security requirements. The results help us to harden the
technology against potential future attacks.
Impact and sustainable development
SD-WAN is introduced as a new, advanced solution for providing enterprise
networking. Our thesis focuses on SD-WAN and it helps in identifying and
evaluating its weaknesses, which will help in improving its security. Specif-
ically, it helps the service providers to understand the SD-WANs security
concerns before offering it to their customers. Thus, it will have an impact
on SD-WAN’s wide-scale deployment, which in turn will have an effect on
the economic sustainability of service providers. Once SD-WAN has been
accepted and deployed globally, this thesis work will contribute to the global
sustainable development of enterprise network services. Further, this the-
sis brings ethical impacts to the society by revealing the threats and attack
surfaces, which might have been exploited by the criminals to attack the
enterprise network and incur losses. We believe that through this research
work, the device vendors can see the significance of the threat and will make
an effort to mitigate it. As engineers working to deploy new innovative
technology, it is our responsibility to ensure its information security before
deployment to critical enterprise systems.
Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into six chapters including this introductory chapter.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of enterprise networking and its current solution,
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MPLS along with its disadvantages. Then, the architecture and working of an
SD-WAN solution is discussed. Finally, we list the related literature, which
is used as a starting point for our security analysis. Chapter 3 introduces the
SD-WAN product, Nuage VNS, offered by the Nuage Networks. We study
its architecture and operation in this chapter. Further, we also look into
the available security features in Nuage VNS and discuss the results of our
analysis on them. Chapter 4 presents the vulnerabilities found in the Nuage
VNS in our detailed analysis. We exploited some of the weaknesses and per-
formed attacks on Nuage VNS, which is also explained in detail. In chapter
5, we explain the mitigation steps to avoid the attacks and, in addition, we
discuss the need for changes in the design which will prevent the attacks on
SD-WAN in the future. Finally, the concluding section summarizes the key
findings of the thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter gives an overview of enterprise networking history and its ex-
isting solutions, along with the drawbacks. Here, we also discuss about the
innovative networking technologies that are used in a new alternative, SD-
WAN. The SD-WAN architecture and its benefit as an enterprise networking
solution are discussed, as well as the necessity for security analysis of SD-
WAN solutions. Finally, we provide a brief overview of the literature used as
reference for performing the analysis.
2.1 Enterprise networks
Enterprise network is a private network to connect an organization’s branches
securely for sharing computer resources. The company branches may include
company sites, stores, headquarters, and cloud data centers. The enterprise
network also forms a communication backbone by integrating all computers,
mobiles and other associated devices of an organization. Further, it facilitates
interoperability of all these devices within the network. It also improves
enterprise data management1.
An enterprise network can be both local area network (LAN) and wide
area network (WAN). Figure 2.1 shows a simple enterprise network with its
headquarters, branches and data center connected. Traditionally, enterprise
networks used the same telecom networks as voice communication, with very
low bandwidth modems to transmit data. However, with the digitization
and public internet usage from the 1990s, enterprises started to use virtual
private networks that are built over the existing public infrastructure and add
encryption to protect the data traffic from eavesdropping. Initially, virtual
private network used the frame relay service [10] for providing a private
1https://www.techopedia.com/definition/7044/enterprise-network
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Figure 2.1: Enterprise Network [28]
network. Later, it has been replaced by the MPLS protocol, which is widely
accepted and used by all the enterprise networks now.
2.2 Existing MPLS-based networking solution
Enterprise networks started to use the MPLS protocol for their private net-
work from the middle of 2000s. The MPLS protocol increases data speed
over the network and improves network’s performance. Traditionally, net-
work packets are routed to their destination by routers based on packet’s
network layer header. A router analyses the IP header and decides where
to forward the packet next. Thus, the routing decision is performed at layer
3 of network. With MPLS, the routing decision is made based on assigned
labels instead of the IP header. Labels are added to a data packet by a
ingress router as it is forwarded to the operator network. Routers analyse
the labels and forward the packet to the next router. They do not spend
time on analyzing the IP header. Routers usually have set of rules stating
where to forward the packets based on their labels. Labels are in the MPLS
header, which are prefixed before the IP header. A sample MPLS network
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 15
with customer edge routers is shown in Figure 2.2
Figure 2.2: MPLS Network [24]
The history of MPLS starts with Ipsilon networks, which proposed a flow
management protocol. This protocol works only over Asynchronous Transfer
Mode (ATM). Later Cisco proposed tag switching, which is not restricted
only to ATM. After some time, Cisco renamed it to label switching and
gave it to IETF for open standardization. Then, various vendors started
to contribute and, thus it started to work with various technologies such as
T1/E1, ATM, Frame Relay, and DSL. Since it works over various networking
protocols, it is named as multiprotocol switching.
MPLS has many advantages compared to per-packet routing such as high-
speed data transmission, scalability and flexibility to work over any underly-
ing protocol. Because of these reasons, enterprise network widely use MPLS
based solutions. Service providers started to provide MPLS based solutions
to the enterprises. For example, Sonera in Finland provides a MPLS based
solution called Datanet to its customers, and they are a market leader in this
business in Finland.
2.3 Problems faced with MPLS
MPLS based solutions are widely accepted by most enterprises for their per-
formance, yet there exists some disadvantages which create the need for new
technology. The main disadvantages of MPLS are the costs and adaptation to
new technologies such as cloud. The cost of the MPLS based private WAN
is higher than the normal internet connectivity cost [11]. Apart from the
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cost, deploying MPLS network connection to a new branch location is time
consuming. Currently, Sonera takes around 20 days to provide an MPLS
connection to a new customer site and it may even take longer depending on
the geographic location. The deployment requires manual work in configur-
ing the customer premises router before sending it to the customer location.
Further, a network professional is required at the branch location during the
deployment which adds to the operations costs.
Enterprises are moving towards the cloudification of their applications.
They no longer spend time in setting up the infrastructure for their projects.
They oﬄoad all their computation, storage and data to the public and private
clouds. As enterprises deploy their applications in easily available public
clouds such as Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure, service providers face
problems in providing MPLS connection to those public clouds from the
enterprise sites. The cloud services can be taken into use within minutes,
compared to the weeks of waiting for the MPLS connection. Moreover, some
public cloud services may not support MPLS integration.
Further, MPLS is an old technology, which was developed in the 2000s
and used for around 16 years. Over this time period, many new networking
technologies such as network virtualization and SDN have been developed.
Therefore, it is not surprising that new alternatives have been developed
to replace this traditional, difficult-to-deploy and expensive MPLS based
enterprise network with a more robust and cheaper solution.
2.4 Cutting-edge technologies
As mentioned in the previous section, there is a requirement for new enter-
prise networking solutions that use all the latest networking technologies.
With the evolution of networks over the years, many innovative technologies
have been developed which are discussed in this section.
Software-defined Networking
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a new approach for designing, building
and managing networks [15]. It separates the network’s control from the
forwarding plane for better optimization. The simple architecture of SDN is
shown in Figure 2.3. It consists of a data plane, control plane and application
plane. The network elements are present in the data plane and they focus
on packet forwarding. The control plane comprises SDN controllers, and
they decide where to forward the incoming packet on the network elements.
This decision on the SDN controllers can be controlled by defining rules on
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them. Thus, a controller is easily configurable and programmable. These
flexibilities in SDN simplify networking.
Figure 2.3: Basic SDN Architecture
Network virtualisation
Network virtualization (NV) is the process of converting the network into a
software entity known as virtual network, by decoupling the network from
the underlying network hardware2. It virtualizes the network resources or
pathways to achieve application or tenant isolation. In network virtualiza-
tion, the L2-L7 network services are decoupled from the network hardware
and provided as a software to run the virtual network. NV solves many net-
working challenges especially in data centers where the network needs to be
created on demand, without modifying the underlying infrastructure.
Network function virtualisation
Network function virtualization (NFV) is the concept of running a network
function in a virtual machine on the virtual server infrastructure [21]. The
2https://www.sdxcentral.com/sdn/network-virtualization/resources/whats-network-
virtualization/
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network functions such as firewall, load balancer and NATs are tradition-
ally run on a customized proprietary hardware and, through NFV, these
appliances could be replaced and run on the virtual machines. Usually, the
traditional hardware is expensive and results in high dependency on the ven-
dor hardware. However, with the advancements in virtualization technology
and increase in the computing power of x86 microprocessors, network func-
tions can be implemented as a virtual application. Thus, NFV reduces the
cost and the vendor dependency for the network components.
Cloud computing
Cloud computing is the process of accessing, storing and computing data on
data centers over the internet, instead of our local machines. The datacenters
can be public, private or hybrid. Cloud computing provides high comput-
ing power, high performance and scalability with low cost for the services.
Due to the availability of high-speed networks and low-cost internet service,
enterprises started to use cloud. It decreases the infrastructure set-up costs
for the enterprises as well reduces set-up time where they can focus on their
projects instead of infrastructure setup. Cloud providers started to offer pay-
as-you-go policies where customers are charged based on their usage. Apart
from computing and storage, network solution can also be provided through
the cloud by running virtualized network components in the cloud.
Overlay network and its encapsulation techniques
An overlay network is built on top of the existing physical network, connected
by the logical or virtual links. This virtual network allows the network re-
source to be dynamically provisioned and, therefore, it is mainly used in
the cloud data centers where the network can be easily managed and provi-
sioned based on the needs. The overlay network also offers programmability
of network without changing the underlying network fabrics by adding the
intelligent devices at the edges that can be programmed by the controller.
These edge devices encapsulate the overlay network packets within the core
network packets, forming a virtual network among the edge devices. Thus,
the encapsulation plays an important role in the overlay network. There are
different encapsulation techniques available such as VXLAN and GRE. Of
these, VXLAN is widely used because of its scalability.
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VXLAN
Virtual Extensible LAN (VXLAN) is the encapsulation protocol used for run-
ning an overlay network on an existing layer 3 infrastructure3. It is mainly
used in the WAN and cloud computing environments where isolation of ten-
ants and apps is needed and the virtual networks may extend to many sites
over the public IP network. Each tenant in a cloud has its own logical network
and network ID, provided by VXLAN. VXLAN is an extension of traditional
VLAN, which is used only in the LAN environment because of its limited
4096 network IDs. VXLAN has 16 million unique network IDs that allows
this encapsulation technique to function over the WAN also.
2.5 SD-WAN solution
Using the above cutting-edge technologies, a new enterprise network solu-
tion, SD-WAN has been developed. This section discusses the SD-WAN
architecture and its benefits.
Software defined wide area network (SD-WAN) solution is an internet-
based, cloud-enabled networking service, offered to the enterprises. It vir-
tualizes the networking service and eases the complexity of configuring and
managing the enterprise network. It is based on the SDN overlay model
where the user traffic is encapsulated and then forwarded over the existing
network fabrics. The overlay model does not require any change in the ex-
isting network fabric; rather it adds the intelligence to the edge device which
encapsulates the traffic4. The edge devices form a logically separate network
on top of the existing infrastructure. The logical network can be formed over
any IP network irrespective of the underlying access technologies.
The controller in the control plane controls the edge devices. It acts as
a data plane of the network where the traffic is processed as directed by the
controller. Figure 2.4 shows the overlay network with edge devices forming
a virtual network on top of the physical network. There exists a similar
software-defined overlay network in the cloud data centers where the network
is virtualized within the datacenter. We extend the same technology for the
enterprise WANs across different geographic locations [17]. The edge devices
are provided as a customer premises equipment to all the branches and data-
centers of the enterprise. A centralized controller controls these CPEs, and
the CPEs form a logically separate network using an encapsulation method
such as VXLAN or GRE. In addition, encrypting the encapsulated traffic
3http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/VXLAN
4https://www.sdxcentral.com/sdn/resources/what-is-overlay-networking/
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Figure 2.4: SDN Overlay Network [5]
increases security. Figure 2.5 shows the deployment of SD-WAN solution
across the different branches and data centers of an enterprise. The SD-
WAN solution offers zero touch provisioning of CPEs. Usually CPEs are
configured by network professionals at the customer site whereas, in SD-WAN
it is provisioned automatically and does not need any network professional
at the site. It also offers segmenting of the network, where the customer can
choose the types of traffic to be directed over the overlay network and the
public internet. Thus, it reduces congestion in the overlay network because
enterprise can use it only for high-priority data.
2.6 Need for security analysis of SD-WAN so-
lution
The SD-WAN solution is a replacement for the existing MPLS based network
solution. The MPLS based solution is considered reliable and has been pro-
vided as a secure enterprise network solution for the past 16 years by service
providers. Since MPLS keeps the customer’s data separate from the other
data streams, it is considered secure and there have been few attacks over
the years5. On the other hand, SD-WAN uses the insecure public internet
for transporting the enterprise data. It uses the latest technologies such as
5http://www.rcrwireless.com/20140513/wireless/mpls-security
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Figure 2.5: SD-WAN Solution
encapsulation and SDN, which are not considered as stable as MPLS in the
industry. SDN has many attack surfaces when compared to the traditional
network. These article [12][13] list various security attack vectors. SDN’s
centralized controller is a potential single point of attack and failure [22],
and its southbound interface is also vulnerable to the attacks which might
affect the availability and performance of the network. Further, SDN allows
programmability of the network using its northbound interface. It is always
considered as an advantage as it provides more flexibility. However, it also
acts as a potential vulnerability where the hackers can trick the engineers to
install a compromised application that can reprogram the network [22].
Apart from the SDN weaknesses, vulnerabilities also exist in handling the
CPE, which is configured automatically at the customer site. In addition, the
CPE is handled and deployed by a non-professional person at the customer
site whereas, in MPLS, CPEs are provisioned and deployed by the network
professionals, which is more secure when compared to the SD-WAN deploy-
ment. Further, enterprises expect a secure and reliable network service for
their office sites. Considering all the above factors, there is a necessity to an-
alyze the SD-WAN solution from the security perspective. The outcomes of
security analysis will help us realize the vulnerable areas and attack surfaces
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of SD-WAN, and these lessons can be used to propose countermeasures for
mitigating the attacks in the future.
2.7 Related literature
In the previous sections, we discussed about SD-WAN solution and the need
for security analysis for such solution. This section discusses the systematic
analysis procedure used while performing security analysis of SD-WAN. We
refer to the related literature works that performed similar security analysis.
ONUG SD-WAN working group has released a white paper [27] which
provides a set of tactical and strategic requirements for an SD-WAN solution,
including the security requirements. The important security requirements,
to be considered are listed below.
1. Check the type of encryptions and the encryption algorithms, key
length and frequency of key rotation.
2. Check how the security threats such as spoofing, session hijacking and
man-in-the-middle attack are handled.
3. Check the PKI (public key infrastructure) implementation and the CA
(certification authority) associated with it. Check the process of key
generation, distribution and revocation of invalid keys.
4. Check the controller’s security and access control for accessing its north-
bound API.
5. Check how the AAA (authentication, authorization and accounting) is
handled in SD-WAN.
The above requirements are considered during our analysis and we ver-
ified whether the given SD-WAN product satisfies them. Many research
papers [33] [18] [32] [31] focus on the SDN’s controller security and lists the
key security issues to be considered while analyzing a controller. Some of
the key security issues are unauthorized access, data leakage and denial of
service, which have been considered during our analysis on SD-WAN’s con-
troller. Then, we focused on the controller’s southbound interface that is the
OpenFlow protocol in our case. We used [16] [2] [34] as references.
After analyzing the SDN components, we focused on the security of the
CPE, which is usually a Linux box. We analyzed the attack surfaces of the
CPE as guided in this research paper [19]. This paper analyses and mea-
sures the given system’s attack surfaces in terms of three kinds of resources:
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methods, channels and data. Then, we concentrated on the PKI implemen-
tation and the associated certification authority. The hierarchy of CAs and
the process of key generation and distribution are examined as in [8]. Gen-
erally, misuse of keys and certificates leads to the man-in-the-middle attack
[3][4], and we tested the possibilities of such attacks in SD-WAN. Finally, we
focused on verifying the access control implemented in the SD-WAN compo-
nents. Usually, insufficient access control results in attacker acquiring high
priority information [30] and, therefore, role based access control has sug-
gested for SD-WAN [39]. As the wider context for our work, we refer to the
literature on threat analysis [36][6] and penetration testing [37][9][1].
Chapter 3
Case study:Nuage VNS solution
In the previous chapter, we discussed the significance of SD-WAN for the
enterprise networks and the need for security analysis for such solutions. In
this chapter, we will do a case study of Nuage VNS, which is one of the
SD-WAN solution available in the market. Our case study involves learning
the architecture of Nuage VNS and then analyzing them from the security
perspective. As a result, we found some vulnerabilities and performed some
attacks, which are explained in the following chapter. We used Nuage VNS
version 3.2 release 6 for our analysis.
We divide this chapter into two sections where the first section explains
the Nuage VNS architecture and its operation, and the second section de-
scribes the outcomes of our analysis on the security features of Nuage VNS.
3.1 Nuage VNS architecture
Nuage VNS is an SD-WAN solution offered by Nuage networks. It provides
a secure WAN connection between the sites and the datacenters of an enter-
prise, using the cutting-edge technologies such as VXLAN, SDN and NFV.
It is based on the SDN overlay model that provides connection between the
sites using any IP network. Since only an IP network is needed, it provides
connection between any sites regardless of the service provider and the avail-
able access technologies. Thus, it gives more flexibility as we can deploy it in
any customer location irrespective of its geographic location or the operator
of the access network. The main components of Nuage VNS are the virtu-
alized services directory, virtualized services controller and network services
gateway (NSG). Figure 3.1 shows the components of Nuage VNS.
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Figure 3.1: Nuage VNS Architecture [25]
Virtualized services directory
Virtualized services directory (VSD) is the centralized policy engine that
manages all the components of Nuage VNS solution. It defines rules and
policies to all the NSGs located at the different enterprise sites. It is a
programmable and analytics engine where the network policies can be eas-
ily managed. It allows adding and moving new NSGs to the network via
a graphical user interface. Apart from the GUI, there is an API through
which network admin or user can manage the network services. VSDs can
be deployed as a single machine or in a cluster depending on the workload
and scaling needs.
The VSD also acts as a statistics server where the network traffic statistics
across the sites are collected. These statistics are aggregated over hours, days
and months and stored in a Hadoop analytics cluster to facilitate data mining
and performance reporting [26]. Further, VSD manages the security policies
for all the NSGs. It also has an network function store from where user
can select the network functions needed for their service. Network functions
include services such as firewall, DNS and DHCP.
Virtualized services controller
The Nuage virtualized services controller (VSC) is the SDN controller of
the Nuage VNS product. It acts as a robust control plane for the network
services and maintains a complete view of network topologies and services.
It has a northbound and southbound interface. The northbound interface
can be accessed by VSD through the XMPP protocol. Apart from VSD, no
other component can access the northbound interface of VSC. The south-
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bound interface uses OpenFlow protocol to access the NSGs that act as a
data-forwarding plane. VSC uses customized OpenFlow messages for pro-
gramming the Open vSwitch residing in NSGs.
To provide redundancy and scalability, multiple VSC instances can be
instantiated within or across the network. The multiple VSC instances com-
municate through the Multiprotocol Border Gateway Protocol (MP-BGP).
MP-BGP is an extension to the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that enables
BGP to carry routing information for multiple network layers and address
families [14]. It is a secure and highly scalable network technology to increase
the number of VSC instances according to the business requirements.
Network services gateway
Network services gateway (NSG) constitutes the data-forwarding plane for
the customer’s network. It acts as a customer premises equipment (CPE)
which is placed in the different customer sites such as headquarters, branches
and private data centers. NSG is available as both physical hardware and vir-
tual software. Physical hardware is placed in the branches and headquarters
whereas virtual NSG software is installed in the public and private clouds.
NSG has an Open vSwitch that contacts the VSC through the OpenFlow pro-
tocol. VSC applies the network policies, defined by VSD, to NSGs through
OpenFlow messages.
The NSG is deployed at the customer sites using an automated pro-
cess called bootstrapping. Once bootstrapped, it creates an overlay virtual
network with the other NSGs of the enterprise. Then it encapsulates and
de-encapsulates user traffic, enforcing Layer 2 to Layer 4 network policies
as defined by the VSD [26]. Further, encryption is also performed by NSG
through IPsec. Service chaining can be instantiated at NSG by defining a
service policy in VSD. Service chaining includes services such as firewall,
DHCP and DNS.
Other components
The other important components of Nuage VNS are key server, certification
authority, notification application and proxy. The key server resides in the
VSD and it generates the cryptographic keys and seeds needed for the NSG
to encrypt user traffic. The configurations of the key server are managed
by the admin through VSD. Certification authority (CA) is a public key
infrastructure that issues certificates to the different components of the Nuage
VNS. These certificates are used for authorization and authentication of the
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components during their communication. Further, it also verifies the digital
certificates coming from the NSGs during the bootstrapping process.
Proxy, a separate entity, acts as an intermediary between the NSG and
VSD for bootstrap requests. It intercepts all HTTPS requests between the
NSG and VSD. It also serves as a certificate-based proxy offering multiple
HTTPS endpoints. The notification application sends the activation mail to
the installer through the SMTP server. It also takes care of sending activation
code as an SMS to the installer during bootstrapping process. Usually, the
notification application is installed in the same machine as the proxy.
3.1.1 Nuage VNS operation
VSD and VSC are deployed within the service provider’s private trusted
network. These software components can be installed in the virtual Linux
machines running in the cloud such as OpenStack or VMware. NSG is a cus-
tomer premises equipment (CPE), which is placed in the customer’s branch
location. NSG, located in the customer site, communicates to VSD and VSC
through the public internet. Apart from the physical NSG, we also have a
virtual NSG, which is placed in the datacenter or private cloud of the enter-
prise. These physical and virtual NSGs ensure secure communication among
the branches and data centers of an enterprise. Figure 3.2 shows the Nuage
VNS based wide area network with NSGs deployed in the various branches
and data centers and private clouds of an enterprise.
On ordering, physical NSG boxes are delivered to the customer sites by
the service provider. The delivered NSG boxes are then deployed at the cus-
tomer sites by an automated process called as bootstrapping. Whenever NSG
is connected to the network at the customer site, the bootstrapping process is
initiated. It allows NSG to connect and authenticate itself to VSD by a two-
factor authentication method. After successful authentication, NSG connects
to VSC and brings up a new customer site in the enterprise network. All
devices behind the NSG are now connected to the enterprise network. Since
the bootstrapping process is simple and automated, it does not require any
network specialist to be present at the customer site. Any non-professional
in the customer site can perform the bootstrapping. After the bootstrap-
ping, NSG establishes a VXLAN overlay network connection with the NSGs
of the other branch sites belonging to the same enterprise. It encapsulates
all its user traffic, enforcing Layer 2 to Layer4 network policies as defined by
the VSD. To ensure secure enterprise communication, it also encrypts the
user traffic before forwarding to other NSGs. As mentioned in Section 3.1,
NSG forwards the traffic based on the network policies enforced by VSD.
VSD can enforce policies such as traffic oﬄoading where the NSG forwards
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Figure 3.2: Nuage VNS Deployment [25]
the sensitive enterprise data traffic through the secure overlay network and
the remaining user traffic can breakout locally through the public internet
connection. This increases the bandwidth of the overlay network. Apart
from the network policies, advanced network services such as firewall and
load balancing can be also enforced in the NSG through VSD.
3.2 Nuage VNS security features
We discussed the architecture and operation of Nuage VNS in the previous
section. This section explains the security features implemented by the Nuage
VNS and the results of our analysis on them.
3.2.1 Interfaces of Nuage VNS
The Nuage VNS solution has several different components and various com-
munication interfaces between them. Some of the interfaces are open in the
internet, which might be vulnerable to attacks. Thus, we studied all the
interfaces of Nuage VNS and the communication protocols associated with
them. Further, we also verified that each connection between the Nuage
components is encrypted and authenticated.
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The main communication protocols used are XMPP, OF-TLS and HTTPS.
The XMPP protocol is used between the VSC and the VSD as shown in Fig-
ure 3.3. XMPP1 (eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol) is based on
the extensible markup language (XML) and is used mainly in instant messag-
ing applications. It exchanges messages instantly between any two network
entities. VSD communicates the OpenFlow rules and the security policies
to VSC through XMPP. Later VSC applies these policies to the respective
NSGs. We found that this connection is encrypted and authenticated. It
uses TLS connection over XMPP. The required certificates and key pairs
for TLS are generated by the VSP CA during the installation. Thus, it is
hard for the attacker to intercept this XMPP connection between the VSC
and VSD. Further, this connection lies within the service provider’s private
trusted network, which ensures that this connection is secure.
Figure 3.3: Nuage VNS Interfaces
OF-TLS is the OpenFlow over TLS connection protocol that is used be-
tween the NSG and the VSC. VSC communicates the OpenFlow rules to the
Open vSwitch residing in the NSG through OF-TLS protocol. Since NSG
1https://xmpp.org/
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communicates with VSC on the customer site, this connection is established
through the insecure public internet. However, this interface is authenticated
and data sent over this connection are always encrypted. The encryption uses
the VSP CA’s certificates and key pairs present in the NSG and the VSC.
Open vSwitch, which resides in the NSG, is customized and uses proprietary
OpenFlow messages. Thus it hard for the attackers to read this connection.
HTTPS is a standard HTTP over TLS connection, which is used be-
tween the NSG, proxy and the VSD. This connection is initiated mainly
during the bootstrapping process where NSG queries VSD via the proxy for
certificates and configuration. NSG authentication is also performed through
this HTTPS connection. Once authenticated, VSD sends the VSP CA cer-
tificates, key pairs and configuration information through this connection.
We have two HTTPS connection between the proxy and NSG, one over port
12443 and other over 11443. Each uses its own set of certificates and key
pairs while establishing a HTTPS connection.
Thus, all the interfaces between the VNS components are encrypted, au-
thenticated and therefore appear to be well protected from the outsiders.
3.2.2 NSG and the bootstrapping process
NSG is a Linux box with the Red Hat operating system. It has a customized
Open vSwitch, which talks to the Nuage controller, once activated. NSG
box has six ports that include one WAN port and LAN ports. During dual
uplink scenario, LAN port1 can also act as a WAN port. NSG is connected
to the internet by the WAN port. Devices at the customer site are connected
to one of the LAN ports in order to join the enterprise network. Figure 3.4
shows the real NSG box along with its physical ports. We can log into the
NSG box through SSH on port 893. It allows only the nuage user with the
default factory-set password. For security purposes, the nuage user has been
given only few privileges and it can execute only a minimal commands on
the NSG box. There is also a root user whose password is known only to
the device vendor. He has more privilege and can access all the commands.
Since the root user has more privileges, we tried to crack the root password
in order to analyze its strength. We used John the Ripper password cracker
tool2 with the hash of root password as an input. The root password hash is
obtained from the shadow file in the NSG. However, the tool failed to crack
the password, which indicates that the root password is strong and secure.
NSG is delivered to the customer site without any pre-configuration. It is
configured only at the customer site by a process called bootstrapping. The
2http://www.openwall.com/john/
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Figure 3.4: NSG box
bootstrapping process allows NSG to securely connect to VSD, download its
respective configuration, and connect to the enterprise network. Since there
is no pre-configuration, there are chances of bootstrapping NSG from any
external network such as the attacker’s home network. To avoid such attacks,
Nuage VNS has a two-factor authentication process during bootstrapping.
The two factors are the installer’s e-mail and phone number. Whenever
an NSG is ordered, an e-mail is sent to the installer with the activation
link. The installer has to connect his computer to port 3 of NSG and start
the bootstrapping process by clicking the activation link. On clicking the
link, an activation code is sent to the installer’s phone number, which has
to be entered by the installer to proceed further. This activation code is
valid for 60 seconds and thus he has to request for new one if he fails to
enter within 60 seconds. Once the correct activation code is entered, NSG
is authenticated and continues the bootstrapping process by downloading
configuration information.
Thus, the two-factor authentication process prevent NSG from bootstrap-
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ping in any external network and getting nevertheless connected to the en-
terprise network.
3.2.3 Control plane security: VSC security
This section analyses the security of VSC that acts as a control plane in
the Nuage VNS services. Being a controller, VSC manages the whole data-
forwarding plane and plays an important role in managing the network ser-
vices across the branch sites. In the world of SDN, the security of controller
is a major concern as it is a potential single point of attack and failure [22].
There are several attacks possible on the controller [7]. Attackers can also
perform a denial of service attack [38] on controller in order to disrupt the
network service. Further, the northbound interface of the controller will be
the attacker’s main target as it allows to degrade and modify the network
using programmable APIs [12]. Considering the importance, we investigated
the security of VSC in detail, including all its accessible interfaces.
VSC is provided as a virtual machine application, which can be instanti-
ated on the cloud such as OpenStack and VMware. It is built over the Alcatel
Lucent’s service router operating system. It is a proven, robust and secure
operating system as many of the routers in the world are running it. The
operating system is hardened in such a way that the user can access only
limited commands. VSCs management interface has an industry-standard
CLI, which looks similar to SNMP management. Thus, it avoids the criti-
cal command execution that may affect the data plane. Further, the VSC
northbound interface can be accessed only by the VSD through XMPP-TLS.
Apart from VSD, no other third-party application is allowed to access the
northbound API, which makes the system robust. The southbound interface
uses OpenFlow over TLS. TLS is made mandatory in order to avoid eaves-
dropping and spoofed OpenFlow messages. VSC also allows redundancy in
case of failure of anyone of them.
3.2.4 IPsec key rotation method
NSG performs IPsec encryption of user traffic that traverses over the WAN
networks between the branch sites or between the branch and headquarters.
We analyzed this IPsec encryption to understand the steps and encryption
methods used. This section explains those methods and the security consid-
ered in them.
IPsec encryption uses a symmetric key for encrypting and decrypting
the user traffic. All NSGs use the same traffic encryption key (TEK) at
a time, and these keys are periodically changed by the key server in VSD
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using a key rotation method. Since the TEKs are changed periodically, time
is synchronized among all NSGs using an NTP server. VSC acts as the
NTP server that periodically updates time to all NSGs. This prevents a
time mismatch in NSGs which could lead to a failure of the key rotation
method. Further, VSC updates time using the OF-TLS connection, which is
an encrypted and authenticated connection. This prevents NTP spoofing on
NSGs.
To make the key rotation method secure, the TEKs are not directly dis-
tributed among the NSGs. Instead, they distribute the following crypto-
graphic materials, seed encryption key (SEK) and seed among the NSGs.
SEK is internally generated by the Key Server and it is encrypted using the
public key of the NSG, which is generated as a part of bootstrapping pro-
cess. These encrypted SEKs are stored in the key server for distribution to
the NSGs later. The seed is the keying material for generating TEKs in the
NSG. The seed material is encrypted using SEK and signed by the key server.
It is also stored in key server for later distribution.
Figure 3.5: Key transport path
The encrypted SEKs and seed are distributed to NSGs in the following
steps.
1. The encrypted SEK is first distributed to the NSGs by the key server.
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NSG decrypts SEK using its private key and stores it.
2. Now, the encrypted seed is distributed by the key server to NSGs. NSG
decrypts the seed using the SEK obtained in the first step.
3. NSG generates TEK using the seed material obtained in the second
step. NSG uses a proprietary algorithm to generate TEK from the
seed.
4. TEK remains the same across all NSGs at a particular time. User traffic
is encrypted using TEK and decrypted by other NSGs using their copy
of the TEK.
The SEKs and seed are distributed in the following path as shown in Fig-
ure 3.5. It is transported from VSD to VSC over XMPP-TLS and from VSC
to NSG over OF-TLS. Both these connections are encrypted and authenti-
cated, which prevents outsiders to access these keys. Further, encryption and
signing of the seed material uses updated protocols such as HMAC SHA-1
for authentication, AES256 CBC for encryption, and SHA-256 with RSA for
signing. It appears that the IPsec encryption method is secure enough. In
case if any NSG is compromised, then the admin can revoke all keys in the
NSGs and generate and distribute new SEKs, seeds and TEKs.
Thus, as far as we can see the key rotation method provides secure IPsec
encryption of user traffic among the NSGs.
Chapter 4
Vulnerabilities and attack scenar-
ios
We performed security analysis of each component of the Nuage VNS plat-
form and the interfaces among them. The focus of our analysis was primarily
on the Network Service Gateway (NSG) since it is available on the customer
premises and easily accessible to an attacker when compared to the other
components. Further, a non-professional at the branch office handles NSG.
He performs the NSGs activation that involves the two-factor authenticated
bootstrapping process as mentioned in Section 3.2.2. Despite the two-factor
authentication, we suspected potential vulnerabilities and investigated on it
further. Thus, our analysis concentrated on the NSG and its bootstrapping
process. On detailed enquiry, we found some vulnerabilities in the NSG. Fur-
ther, we also found some attacks possible on the NSG during bootstrapping
process. These vulnerabilities and attacks are explained in this chapter.
Throughout this chapter, we specify three roles: vendor, service provider
and customer. The vendor refers to the technology provider, which is Nuage
Networks in our case. The service provider refers to operators such as Sonera.
Customers are the enterprises who buy the technology and WAN service from
the service provider and deploy it at their sites.
4.1 Analysis of NSG attack surfaces
In this section, we look into the attack surfaces of the NSG. We analysed
the different possible ways to access this Linux box, NSG. As mentioned in
Section 3.2.2, a user can connect to NSG through six physical ports. Apart
from these physical ports, we analysed other possible ways to access the NSG
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box. We run nmap using Nmap-zenmap GUI tool1 to find open TCP ports.
We found TCP ports 80, 53 and 893 open as shown in Figure 4.1. The nmap
result also shows that SSH is open at port 893.
Figure 4.1: Nmap Results
As per the documentation of the product, port 893 is open for SSH for
nuage user. Being given limited access, the nuage user can execute restricted
commands in the NSG box. SSH is open to the installer when connected
through LAN port of the NSG box as shown in Figure 4.2. Apart from port
893, port 80 is also open to the installer. A web server is running in this
port and is accessible to the installer when connected to LAN port 3 of the
NSG box. Since these open ports are potential attack surfaces, we focussed
our analysis on them. As expected, some vulnerabilities were found which
are explained in the following sections.
1https://nmap.org/zenmap/
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Figure 4.2: NSG at customer site
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4.2 Basic vulnerabilities
This chapter explains some of the simple vulnerabilities found in the NSG
box. We will explain the vulnerabilities in the increasing order of criticality
with the simple ones are explained in the initial sections, followed by the
complex ones in the following sections.
4.2.1 Vulnerability 1: open SSH port
On investigation, we found that SSH port on the NSG is open to the internet
on the WAN port with the default username and password. Usually, NSG
boxes are shipped directly from the factory to the customer site with the
default password. The customer has to change the default password on first
SSH login. However, most customers do not have any reason to connect with
SSH and hence there is a high chance that NSG boxes would be deployed
at the customer sites with the default password. Therefore, the attacker can
login to those NSGs from any location on the internet. NSG also forces one
to change the default password on the first login. Therefore, the attacker will
change the default password before the innocent customer changes it. Figure
4.3 shows the NSG with the open SSH port and the attacker accessing it
from different location. Once logged in to the NSG, the attacker can access
it with the limited nuage user rights.
Attacker could exploit this SSH weakness and perform the attack below.
We assume that attacker knows the default password and the range of IP
addresses where the NSGs are being deployed.
Attack steps
1. Attacker performs a slow scan of the service provider’s IP address space
for SSH servers in port 893.
2. Attacker tries to log in to these nodes with the username nuage and
the default password.
3. If the login is successful, the attacker sets his own password.
4. Attacker can now access the NSG with the nuage user rights. For
example, he can reconfigure the iptables firewall policy of the NSG.
Apart from the nuage user, root user can also login through port 893.
Only the vendor knows the root password and the root can perform all op-
erations in NSG. Therefore, the vendors has access to the NSG boxes at the
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Figure 4.3: NSG with SSH public access
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customer sites and can control the customer’s network without the help of
the service provider.
4.2.2 Vulnerability 2: open HTTP port
The next weakness was in the activation web server, which is open on port
80 of the NSG. According to the Nuage documentation, this web server is
accessible to the installer laptop connected to LAN port 3. However, our
analysis shows that this web server is open to the internet and can be accessed
remotely. Therefore, any remote user can activate the NSG. Figure 4.4 shows
this remote activation. Thus, an attacker can activate any NSG without its
physical possession.
Attacker could exploit this remote activation weakness and perform the
attack below. Here, it is assumed that the attacker knows the IP address
of the NSG and he activates it before the innocent customer does it. The
attacker should also be a customer of the same service provider and have
some NSGs for his own use.
Attack steps
1. Attacker performs a slow scan of the service provider’s IP address space
for HTTP servers in port 80.
2. Attacker finds an inactive NSG which is going to be activated soon by
an innocent customer.
3. Attacker now inactivates one of its own NSGs, starts the reactivation
process for it, and receives the activation email.
4. This activation e-mail is used to activate the inactive NSG found in
step 2.
5. The NSG and the network behind it will now be connected to the
attacker’s intranet.
4.2.3 Vulnerability 3: activation e-mail
In this section, we discuss other low priority vulnerabilities found in the
Nuage platform.
On analysis of the activation mail sent by Nuage platform to the installer,
we found that the activation mail contains data in base64-encoded format.
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Figure 4.4: NSG remote activation
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When we decode the data, we found some critical information such as the
installer phone number, e-mail, location of NSG and its UID. Figure 4.5
shows the data available after decoding activation mail.
Figure 4.5: Activation mail decoded results
If the attacker hijacks an activation e-mail, he can obtain information
about the NSG and its installer. In particular, decoding the activation e-
mail reveals the installer phone number to which the activation code will be
sent as an SMS. Now the attacker knows the mobile number to be hacked
for obtaining the activation code. The attacker may be able to hack the
SMS from a mobile in many ways. He can perform social engineering to get
the activation code. In social engineering, attacker calls the installer directly
and tricks him to reveal the activation code. If the installer believes the
attacker, he might tell the activation code. Apart from social engineering,
the SMS can also be obtained by installing trojans or apps in the installer’s
mobile. Many SMS hacking apps such as mspy2 and mobile spy3 are available
in the market. To install these apps in the installer’s mobile, the attacker
needs to access the mobile phone at least once. Hacking the SMS is also
possible by using SS7 vulnerabilities as mentioned in this whitepaper [29]
released by Positive technologies. Another paper [23] about security of SMS
based one time password summarizes that one time password over SMS is
not secure anymore and there are various attacks possible to crack the one
time password. This proves that SMS with activation code is not a strong
authentication method anymore. In our case, if the attacker hijacks the e-
2https://www.mspy.com/
3http://www.mobilespy.net/
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mail, he may be able break the second factor SMS by trying one of the above
methods.
Further analysis shows that there is no time stamp in the activation mail,
which allows activating an NSG with any old activation e-mail that has not
yet been used. Thus, the attacker will be successful in his attacks if he hijacks
any of the old activation e-mails, provided that the NSG profile associated
with that activation mail has not been used or deleted in the Nuage platform
yet.
We continued our analysis by modifying the values of the activation e-
mail and found that the Nuage platform expects only the UID parameter
with the correct value. The remaining parameters can be fake values, and
hence the attacker can compose his own e-mail by giving only the correct UID
and proxy address. Therefore, the e-mail, the first factor of the two-factor
authentication, relies on the UID value. Besides that, the attacker could
also tamper the e-mail by modifying the proxy address and UID. This cause
a minor denial of service attack for a short interval as the NSG activation
depends on the UID value.
Apart from the above vulnerabilities, there are other social factors af-
fecting the security of this system. Social factors refer to mistakes made
by human beings while handling the customers. One example could be the
scenario in handling big customers. Usually, a big customer orders a large
number of NSGs for the customer sites from the service provider. While
ordering, they would prefer not to enter the installer’s details for all the cus-
tomer sites and mostly end up filling in only IT admin details. The IT admin
receives all the activation e-mails and codes, which would be forwarded to
the installers in the different customer sites. Forwarding the e-mails and
activation codes is not always a secure way, and attacker could use these
circumstances in his favour. The service provider should avoid these kind of
batch deliveries while handling big customers.
4.3 Attacks against the NSG bootstrapping
process
In the previous section, we discussed various vulnerabilities and attacks on
the NSG interfaces. This section discusses the vulnerabilities found in the
bootstrapping process. This section is divided into two subsections where
the first subsection describes the steps involved in the NSG’s bootstrapping
process and the weaknesses associated with it, and the second subsection
demonstrates the possible attacks on the NSG based on its bootstrapping
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weaknesses.
4.3.1 NSG bootstrapping process
Bootstrapping is the initial part of the deployment where NSG securely con-
nects to the controller from the customer site. The installer connected to the
NSG at the customer site initiates this process. At the end of a successful
bootstrapping process, NSG will become active and the devices connected
to it are attached to the respective enterprise network. The main VNS com-
ponents involved during the bootstrapping process are the proxy and VSD.
When the installer is connected to port 3 of NSG and clicks the link in the
activation e-mail, NSG initiates an HTTPS connection to VSD through the
proxy. The proxy lies between NSG and backend VSD, and acts as an inter-
mediary for the requests coming from the NSG towards the backend VSD.
Then, NSG authenticates itself with VSD and downloads all configuration in-
formation including the controller details. Finally, it establishes a connection
with the respective controller and connects to the enterprise network. The
Nuage VNS architecture is shown in Figure 4.6, highlighting the components
and interfaces involved during the bootstrapping process.
To analyse further, we studied each step of the bootstrapping process
in detail. Figure 4.7 shows all the steps between the NSG and the Nuage
components during bootstrapping process. NSG initiates an HTTPS con-
nection to proxy on port number 12443. It uses the nsg-bootstrap certificate
on the NSG side and the proxy-bootstrap certificate in server side, which
is the proxy. The bootstrap certification authority, a third party CA, signs
both these certificates. We do not have information about the origin of the
bootstrap CA. Port 12443 is used only for the initial two HTTPS connec-
tions between the NSG and proxy. Initially, NSG makes an API call /initiate
in the first request. VSD responds by generating a code and sending it as
the SMS to the installer’s mobile number. A notification agent connected to
VSD performs this operation. This API call also returns a seed value to NSG.
When the installer enters the code received via SMS, NSG initiates a second
API call (/authenticate) with the hash values of the seed and the code. Ad-
ditionally, NSG also requests SSL certificates by sending certificate-signing
request to VSD. The hash values of the code and the seed are used for au-
thentication. If they are correct, VSD accepts NSG and generates certificates
for the CSR. These certificates are generated by the VSP certification au-
thority, which resides in VSD. The generated digital certificates are sent back
to NSG. NSG is authenticated now and it contains digitally signed certifi-
cates from VSP CA, which is the central certification authority for providing
certificates to all VNS components of this operator environment. Since NSG
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Figure 4.6: VNS Architecture - Bootstrapping process
received the certificate from this CA, it can establish SSL connection to all
VNS components of this environment. Subsequent HTTP requests uses this
new set of certificates for establishing the SSL connection. Now, NSG initi-
ates a new HTTPS connection to the proxy on port number 11443 with the
new VSP CA certificates. Then, it makes an API call (/get config) to receive
the configuration from VSD. VSD checks the profile of NSG and sends the
respective configuration including the controller’s details. Now NSG has all
the configuration information including the controller to be reached.
NSG initiates an OpenFlow TLS connection to the controller with VSP
CA certificates. Once the connection is successful, the controller sends Open-
Flow rules to NSG and NSG implements the rules. Local traffic is handled
by NSG based on these rules. Thus, the bootstrapping process is successful
with the above steps.
After studying all the steps in details, we focused our security analysis on
the first HTTPS connection between the NSG and proxy as it involves a third
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Figure 4.7: Bootstrapping process steps
party bootstrap CA. We started to investigate the origin of the bootstrap
certificates and their generation in the NSG and proxy. According to Nuage
documentation, NSG devices are not pre-configured and they are delivered to
the customer directly from the factory. This shows that bootstrap certificates
are loaded as a part of Nuage Red Hat OS image in the NSG box. We tried
to access these certificates in the NSG and we were successful in reading
and copying them with the nuage user credentials. We were also able to
copy the private keys and certificates. We checked a different NSG box for
comparison and it contains the same set of bootstrap certificates and private
keys. This confirms that all NSGs seem to be pre-loaded with same bootstrap
certificates irrespective of the customer.
After NSG, we focused on the proxy and the origin of proxy-bootstrap
certificates. According to Nuage documentation, the proxy machine can
be any third party proxy such as F5 or a proxy provided along with other
Nuage components. The F5 proxy is the preferred one to use in production
CHAPTER 4. VULNERABILITIES AND ATTACK SCENARIOS 47
environment. On checking the configurations for both the proxies, the F5
proxy configuration document directs to copy the proxy-bootstrap certificate
from the VM as shown in Figure 4.8. This confirms that the proxy-bootstrap
certificates are not generated but rather copied from the VM given by Nuage.
Next, we checked the documentation of the Nuage proxy where we did not
find any steps for generating a proxy-bootstrap certificate. This further shows
that the proxy-bootstrap certificates come built-in inside the VM. Since the
documentation is common for all service providers, we can assume that all
service providers use the same proxy-bootstrap certificates. This further
proves the point that the NSG boxes are not pre-configured and customised
based on the service provider. So irrespective of the service provider, identical
NSG boxes are delivered to the customers from the device vendor.
Figure 4.8: F5 proxy configuration instructions
We observed that the bootstrap CA certificate and key pair are the same
for all service providers. Thus, it is very likely that the attacker gets access
to the proxy-bootstrap certificates and keys. For example, the attacker may
have an insider working for any one of the service providers that uses the
Nuage technology, or the attacker could even establish a service provider
and obtain the information directly from the vendor. The NSG bootstrap
certificates can also be retrieved from the NSG by the customer by logging
in with SSH. Based on these observations, we devised various attacks that
are explained in the following sections.
4.3.2 Man-in-the-middle attack
This section demonstrates man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, which is per-
formed on the proxy and NSG connection. To perform this attack, we assume
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that globally the same bootstrap keys are used and the attacker is capable of
getting those keys. Based on these assumptions, two types of MITM attacks
are possible. They are MITM on-path and MITM off-path attack.
MITM on-path
In this attack, the attacker lies in the same path between the NSG and proxy.
If he resides in one of the routers on the path from the NSG to proxy, then he
can perform this attack. For example, NSG is delivered to the customer site
abroad where a different internet service provider provides internet connec-
tion. If that service provider decides to spy on the customer’s network, they
could place the MITM tool in one of the routers that provide access to the
customer. All IP packets from the customer site have to pass through this
router. This MITM tool contains both proxy-bootstrap and NSG-bootstrap
keys. It acts as both a proxy and NSG in the middle. Whenever NSG initiates
an HTTPS request to the proxy on port 12443, the MITM tool terminates
this request and initiates a new request to the proxy. The proxy responds to
this request, which will be intercepted by the MITM tool and directed back
to NSG. The sequence of the bootstrapping process after setting the MITM
tool in the middle is shown in Figure 4.9. We performed this attack with
an open source MITM tool4 and recovered the first two HTTPS request as
highlighted in Figure 4.9. The screenshots of the requests captured by MITM
tool is shown in Appendix C. Possibly, we could hack subsequent HTTPS
requests also, which needs some modification in the MITM tool.
MITM off-path
This attack is performed by forcing the NSG to connect to the attacker’s
proxy instead of the Nuage proxy. Then the attacker’s proxy can initiate
a connection to the real Nuage proxy, thus placing the attacker’s proxy in
the middle. Now it can intercept the HTTPS request between the NSG and
proxy. Figure 4.10 shows the attacker’s proxy between the NSG and real
proxy.
Attacker can force NSG to connect to his proxy in three different ways.
1. The attacker spoofs the activation e-mail sent by Nuage, which con-
tains data in base64-encoded format. Figure 4.5 shows the data after
decoding. The result shows the proxy address, and usually NSG con-
nects to this proxy address. The attacker could spoof this e-mail with
4https://mitmproxy.org/
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Figure 4.9: MITM attack
his own proxy address. Thus, NSG will be forced to connect to the
attacker’s proxy, which contains the MITM tool.
2. By exploiting the open SSH port, as explained in Section 4.2.1, the
attacker can reconfigure iptables to reroute the connection to its own
proxy.
3. With DNS poisoning attacks, the attacker may be able to replace the
proxy IP address with its own.
4.3.3 Insufficient access control to APIs
This section explains attacks directed towards the proxy from the attacker’s
computer. These attacks utilize weaknesses associated with the access control
in the backend VSD APIs. The attacker needs the bootstrap client keys and
certificates to perform this attack. He acquires these keys from any one of the
NSGs of that service provider. He exploits the open SSH port, as explained
in Section 4.2.1 and obtains the keys. Attacker should also know the proxy
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Figure 4.10: MITM off-path attack
IP address in order to establish a connection from his computer. The proxy
address can be learnt by decoding the activation e-mails or by spying any
one active NSG and its connections or DNS requests.
Once the attacker possesses the bootstrap keys and the proxy address,
he can establish the SSL connection to the proxy on port 12443 from his
computer anywhere. After establishing the SSL connection, he can access the
APIs of Nuage. The sequence diagram in Figure 4.11 shows the connection
established between the attacker’s computer and the proxy. We performed
this attack from our computer, and the SSL connection was successful. Then
we tried accessing the APIs and found that we can access critical information
that should not be accessible. We were able to collect information such as
the enterprise list, installer details, status of all NSGs with their gateway IDs
and much more. Apart from getting the information, we were also able to
update critical data such as the installer’s phone number and e-mail address.
Updating the phone number allows the attacker to hack any NSG box, since
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it breaks one of the authentication factors in the two-factor authentication
method. We updated the phone number and activated NSG without the
knowledge of the installer. All of the above information has effect during the
bootstrapping process and hence affects only inactive NSGs. We investigated
further to find APIs that affect active NSGs and found an API that revokes
the active NSGs also. By using this API, any active NSG can be made
inactive. Now, the attacker can revoke any NSG in a customer site and
bootstrap it again. The list of accessible APIs is documented in Appendix
A.
Figure 4.11: Attack on proxy using insufficient access control to APIs
The attacker can perform the following attacks by gathering information
using the above APIs. He can remotely join any enterprise network and
access their data. Joining the enterprise network is possible in the following
two ways.
Physical NSG
Attacker has a physical NSG box and bootstrap keys. If the attacker gets
access to any one physical NSG box, he can join any enterprise network using
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the above APIs. The attacker needs to know the UID of any one of the NSGs
in the enterprise. In addition, he needs to know the installer mobile number
associated with that UID. The attacker can get this information by using
the APIs described above. Once this information is known, the attacker can
initiate the activation of his NSG by composing his own activation e-mail.
Through social engineering, as mentioned in Section 4.2.3, the attacker can
obtain the activation code from the installer’s mobile. If social engineering
does not work, still attacker can continue his attack by updating the in-
staller’s phone number with the open API. Now the activation code will be
sent to the attacker’s mobile phone. Thus, the NSG is authenticated and
subsequently it joins the enterprise network.
We performed the above attack and were successful in joining the en-
terprise network with our NSG. The UID used for composing e-mail should
be always inactive or else this attack will not be successful. However, we
can make any UID inactive using the revoke API and hence this attack will
always work.
Emulating NSG
Attacker has only the bootstrap keys. If the attacker has no physical NSG
device, it can emulate an NSG in order to join any enterprise network. The
attacker emulates an NSG and connects to the real proxy where the proxy
considers it as a real NSG and forwards the request to VSD. The attacker’s
emulated NSG performs all the bootstrap requests and it is authenticated.
The attacker uses the same steps as above to break the two-factor authentica-
tion and receives the VSP CA signed certificates. Using the VSP CA signed
certificates, he gets the configuration of NSG including the controller details.
Then, he initiates an OpenFlow TLS connection to the Nuage controller and
connects to the respective enterprise network.
We performed this attack using our emulated NSG and successfully es-
tablished a connection to Nuage proxy. The emulated NSG is authenticated
and VSP CA signed certificates are received. Using these certificates, we ob-
tained the NSG configuration and controller details. The controller details
include its IP address, public key and certificate. We assume that, with this
information, it is possible to connect to the controller using Open vSwitch,
which has not been verified yet.
In addition, we found that using these VSP CA certificates, we could
obtain the configurations of the other NSGs and access to their information.
The possible reason for this behaviour could be lack of access control in
VSD, which should restrict NSG’s access to the APIs of other NSGs. We
mitigated this attack by adding access control at the proxy. After adding
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access control rules, the attacker will not be able to access unwanted APIs
but still he can access APIs that are required during the bootstrapping.
Further, access control did not restrict access to other NSGs information,
which can be obtained by using any one of the NSG’s VSP CA certificates.
4.3.4 Other attacks
This section describes other attacks that lead to denial of service and confu-
sion among the customers. These attacks make use of the bootstrap weak-
nesses and the VSD’s access control weaknesses explained in the above sec-
tions. We assume that the attacker has access to the NSG bootstrap keys and
the IP address range of NSGs. In this attack, the attacker revokes the NSG
in one enterprise and activates it with the UID of another enterprise. Thus,
the customer site belonging to one enterprise is connected to a different en-
terprise network, which leads to confusion, denial of service, and ultimately
giving bad name to the service provider. Here, the NSG is revoked using the
revoke API and its activation is possible remotely using its public web server,
which is explained in Section 4.2.2. The UIDs and the installer details are
obtained and updated by the APIs.
DOS attacks are possible even if the attacker has access only to the proxy
bootstrap keys. NSG is forced to connect to the attacker’s proxy by tamper-
ing the activation e-mail or by updating the iptable rules in NSG. Since the
attacker’s proxy has proxy bootstrap keys, the connection between NSG and
the proxy will be successful. Now the attacker’s proxy will simply reply to
the NSG’s request and even generates and sends a fake activation code to the
installer. Then the proxy forces NSG to connect to the fake controller, which
sends false OpenFlow rules. The installer assumes that he is connected to
the real controller and tries to access enterprise data, which is not possible.
This creates confusion and denial of service for a while. This attack can
be noticed soon after the installer contacts the operator’s customer centre.
Nevertheless, a few hours of confusion will cause bad name to the service
provider.
Chapter 5
Discussion
We discussed the attacks and vulnerabilities of Nuage VNS in the previous
chapter. In this chapter, we discuss the solutions to mitigate the discovered
attacks. In addition, we also describe the possible designs that could solve
the authentication problem of customer premises equipment. Finally, we
propose the future work that can be carried out to proceed further with the
security analysis of SD-WAN.
5.1 Solutions for the attacks
The solutions for the attacks and vulnerabilities are listed in this section, in
the increasing order of criticality.
5.1.1 Minimizing NSG’s attack surface
In order to mitigate the attacks on NSG, we should reduce the NSG’s attack
surfaces. The main attack surfaces are the open SSH and web server port.
These two ports are open to the public internet, which leads to the attacks.
These two ports should be closed to the internet and should be made ac-
cessible only to the user connected to LAN port 3. Thus, only the installer
can access the web server and SSH connection. In addition, the default pass-
words on the NSGs should be changed before deploying it in the customer
site. This can be performed either by the service provider before delivery or
by instructing the customer to change the password before deployment. This
avoids the attacker logging into NSGs and executing commands.
In addition, we should modify the contents of the activation link sent
to the installer. The activation link contains information such as installer’s
phone number, which could be removed to avoid social engineering attacks.
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Further, time validation should be added into the activation link. This pre-
vents the attacker from using old activation links for activation. The acti-
vation link should also be made invalid if it is used more than once. The
service provider should be careful in collecting installer details such as e-mail
and phone number for bigger customers. Correct installer details should be
collected and stored in order to mitigate social engineering attacks.
5.1.2 Replacing the bootstrap CA certificates
Bootstrapping attacks are mainly due to the reuse of the certificates pro-
vided by the global bootstrap CA. We can mitigate this attack by replacing
the global bootstrap CA with the service provider’s own bootstrap CA and
configuring all NSGs and proxies to trust only this service-provider-specific
bootstrap CA. This prevents the attacker’s easy access to the bootstrap cer-
tificates and related private keys as he needs to access the particular service
provider’s proxy and NSG for the keys. Still, if he managed to get the
bootstrap certificates from that service provider’s NSG, he can continue the
attacks towards the proxy. We can mitigate this further by configuring all
NSGs to have individual names, certificates and key pairs for the bootstrap
client. These certificates should also be issued by the service provider’s boot-
strap CA. Then, in the backend server (VSD), we can keep a mapping of all
the NSG names and the respective customers.
In addition, the NSG should restrict access to the bootstrap private keys
for the nuage user. This prevents the attackers with SSH access from acquir-
ing the bootstrap private keys without having root access to the NSG.
5.1.3 Adding secure access control at the proxy
Adding secure access control at the proxy restricts access to unnecessary APIs
of VSD. Currently, the attacker is able to access APIs because of lack of ac-
cess control at the proxy. Thus, the proxy machine should be hardened and
its configurations should be changed to allow only APIs that are needed dur-
ing NSG’s bootstrapping and post-bootstrapping stage. The vendor should
provide this list of APIs and configurations for the proxy.
In addition, we need client certificate authentication to avoid access to
other NSG information using any one of the NSGs certificates. Client cer-
tificate authentication is a common feature in most of the proxies that lie
between the client and backend web server. Usually, the HTTPS connection
from the client is terminated at the proxy and the proxy initiates a new con-
nection to the backend web server. Since the client connection is terminated
at the proxy, the backend web server does not have information about the
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client and its certificates. However, the backend web server needs to know
the client identity so that it can perform access control and give permission
to access APIs belonging to that particular client only. For this reason, the
proxy receives and parses the client certificate and adds this information
into one of the HTTP headers sent to the backend server. Now, the backend
server receives the client information so that it can perform the access deci-
sion. Different proxies do certificate parsing in different ways. Appendix B
shows the configurations in F5 proxy and Nginx reverse proxy.
We have this problem in the Nuage platform where the proxy lies between
the NSG (client) and VSD (backend server). Since there is no certificate
parsing happening in the proxy, there is no access validation at VSD, which
enables accessing the configuration information of other NSGs by having a
certificate from anyone of the NSG. Thus, we have to add certificate parsing
and access control in the proxy and VSD respectively in order to make the
APIs secure. That way, the backend server (VSD) API will have fine-grained
access control for the requests based on the authenticated NSG name, the
list of authorized NSGs, and the mapping of NSGs to customers.
If we make all the above changes, then maybe a simpler NSG activa-
tion process would be sufficient because most of the configuration would be
already done before shipping the NSG to the customer.
5.2 General discussion
This section discusses the different designs possible for NSG bootstrapping to
avoid the authentication problems. The main weakness found in the Nuage
VNS is the lack of preconfiguration in the NSG before its delivery. This
results in security weaknesses, which lead to the above attacks. In order to
perform secure bootstrapping, NSG should be configured before delivering it
to the customers. Further, we can also use secure hardware authentication
methods such as TPM for CPE authentication. An overview of TPM and its
usage in CPEs is given in the following section.
5.2.1 TPM
TPM chips should be used in the CPE for authentication. TPM is a computer
chip that securely store the artifacts used to authenticate the platform1. It
provides a hardware based approach for authentication and data protection
that improves the security to a higher lever than pure software security. TPM
1http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/trusted-platform-module-tpm-summary/
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has two RSA key pairs, namely Endorsement Key (EK) and Storage Root
Key (SRK). The endorsement key is stored inside the TPM and cannot be
accessed or modified by software. The endorsement key is unique to each
chip. Storage root key is generated by the combination of Endorsement Key
(EK) and the master password entered by admin. Thus, the admin takes
the ownership of the hardware. Apart from the admin, no one can access
or modify the hardware. TPM uses advanced cryptographic protocols such
as RSA, SHA-1, and HMAC2. TPM is currently used in laptops, computers
and in many types of network equipment for hardware authentication.
TPM can also used be used to generate keys and certificates for TLS au-
thentication. Detailed steps for generating keys and certificates are explained
in this blog [20]. We can use this feature of TPM for authenticating a CPE
which is the NSG in our case. The NSG boxes should be built with the TPM
chips having the capability of generating keys and certificates. The installer
can claim the ownership of NSG by entering the master password provided
by the service provider. This generates unique certificates and keys based
on its Endorsement Key. Now, VSD can authenticate the NSG box based
on these certificates. Since TPM is used, an attacker would not be able to
access these certificates and keys. Thus, the use of TPM prevents the boot-
strapping attacks. In addition, the bootstrapped NSGs cannot be claimed by
anyone unless they know the master password. However, the security of the
master password plays an important role and we should securely distribute
the master passwords to the installers.
5.3 Future work
In this thesis, we have primarily focused our analysis on the customer premises
equipment, NSG, and its bootstrapping phase. We demonstrated the attacks
on the NSG’s HTTPS interface. This work needs to continue in the future
with an analysis of NSG’s OpenFlow interface through which it communi-
cates with the controller. This OpenFlow interface is the southbound inter-
face of controller where the OpenFlow rules are pushed to the NSG. Further,
we should verify the possibility of man-in-the-middle attack in the OpenFlow
interface and intercepting the OpenFlow messages.
We checked the encryption algorithms and the key rotation method used
in the inter-NSG communication. Due to time constraints, we did not spend
much time in analyzing the proprietary protocol used in that interface. As
a part of the future work, the analysis should continue on these proprietary
2http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/trusted-platform-module-tpm-summary/
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protocols in order to find the possible vulnerabilities. In addition, some of
the controller’s interfaces also needs to be checked. For scaling, the controller
uses the MP-BGP protocol to share information about NSGs. The security
of this interface is not analyzed in this thesis, and the work should be done
in the future. Further, the northbound interface of the controller, which is
VSD’s API interface, should be analyzed. Extensive testing is required to
check the correctness of access control at VSD.
As a part of this thesis, we analyzed only one commercial SD-WAN solu-
tion, Nuage VNS from Nuage Networks. There are many similar SD-WAN
solutions available in the market from many vendors such as Huawei and HP.
In the future, we would like to perform a similar security analysis of other
SD-WAN products provided by major vendors. This analysis will give further
knowledge about the possible attack surfaces and the potential vulnerabilities
of SD-WAN products in general. This would be helpful in creating general
security guidelines to service providers such as Sonera for providing secure
SD-WAN service to their customers.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
SD-WAN transforms the future of enterprise networking by providing a flex-
ible and easily manageable network solution to the enterprises. Currently,
the enterprises are trying to reduce their operational cost by dropping MPLS
links, and the service providers are facing problems in providing MPLS with
cloudification support. This trend has led to operators considering SD-WAN
as a better solution for the enterprise. However, the introduction of IP-
based SD-WAN will increase the risk of potential attacks on the enterprise
networks, which are attractive targets for attackers. Hackers are always in-
terested in enterprise networks as they contain valuable computing assets and
data. Therefore, both service providers and enterprises consider SD-WAN se-
curity as utmost priority, before deploying the new technology widely. In this
thesis, we analyzed one such SD-WAN solution, Nuage VNS, and exposed
its attack surfaces and security vulnerabilities and finally demonstrated the
possible attacks on it.
We first studied about the enterprise WAN networks, various solutions
from the past, and the concept of SD-WAN. Its advantages over the past
solutions are explained. Further, we also discussed the need for security
analysis on SD-WAN and the related literature based on which to perform
such analysis. Chapter 3 introduced the SD-WAN product for our case study,
Nuage VNS and described its architecture and operation. Then, we analyzed
Nuage VNS by investigating its various components and interfaces in detail.
As a result, many attack surfaces and security weaknesses were found, es-
pecially in the customer premises equipment of Nuage VNS. We also found
vulnerabilities in the CPE bootstrapping method and demonstrated some
man-in-the-middle attacks by exploiting those vulnerabilities. Finally, we
articulated the mitigation strategies to avoid the attacks on NSG and pro-
posed TPM as a starting point for a more secure design that could solve the
authentication problems.
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The results of the thesis proved that as expected, many new attack sur-
faces and vulnerabilities can be introduced to enterprise network on providing
SD-WAN solution. Considering the magnitude of past attacks on enterprise
networks, attackers would easily exploit these weaknesses and cause damage
and loss to the enterprises. Thus, both the vendors and the service providers
should be aware of these vulnerabilities before providing the technology to
enterprises. They should also implement suitable countermeasures to mit-
igate the attacks as a precautionary step. However, if they ignore these
security weaknesses, many attacks on SD-WAN would be witnessed in the
future after its wide-scale deployment. We have reported the vulnerabilities
in Nuage VNS to the vendor and, based on the constructive response, expect
that our work will have a positive effect on the product security.
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Appendix A
Accessible APIs
1. API call to get enterprises list
wget -d –secure-protocol=TLSv1 –certificate=bootstrap.crt –certificate-
type=PEM –private-key=bootstrap.key –ca-certificate=BootstrapRootCA.pem
https://proxy-bootstrap:12443/nuage/api/v3 2/enterprises
2. API call to get gateway list
wget -d –secure-protocol=TLSv1 –certificate=bootstrap.crt –certificate-
type=PEM –private-key=bootstrap.key –ca-certificate= BootstrapRootCA.pem
https://proxy-bootstrap:12443/nuage/api/v3 2/gateways
3. API call to get status of nsg. We get the json result file where all
the parent id’s denote the nsg. We can find the active nsg based on
creation and last updated date.
wget -d –secure-protocol=TLSv1 –certificate=bootstrap.crt –certificate-
type=PEM –private-key=bootstrap.key –ca-certificate= BootstrapRootCA.pem
https://proxy-bootstrap:12443/nuage/api/v3 2/jobs
4. API call to get installers list
wget -d –secure-protocol=TLSv1 –certificate=bootstrap.crt –certificate-
type=PEM –private-key=bootstrap.key –ca-certificate= BootstrapRootCA.pem
https://proxy-bootstrap:12443/nuage/api/v3 2/users
5. Script to revoke NSG
import requests, json
url=”https://proxy-bootstrap:12443/nuage/api/v3 2/nsgateways/{UID}/jobs”
data = json.dumps( {”ID”: ”040c714a-51e6-4ec4-8639-43896f195e0f”,
”command”: ”CERTIFICATE NSG REVOKE”})
cafile = ’/home/BootstrapRootCA.pem’
headers = {’Content-type’: ’application/json’}
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r = requests.post(url, data,headers=headers , verify=cafile,
cert=(’bootstrap.crt’, ’bootstrap.key’))
Appendix B
Client certificate authentication
Haproxy:
Configurations to be added at haproxy to send client certificate informa-
tion to backend server are shown below1.
frontend ft www
bind 127.0.0.1:8080 name http
bind 127.0.0.1:8081 name https ssl crt ./server.pem ca-file ./ca.crt verify re-
quired
log-format %ci:%cp [%t] %ft %b/%s %Tq/%Tw/%Tc/%Tr/%Tt %ST %B
%CC %CS %tsc %ac/%fc/%bc/%sc/%rc %sq/%bq %hr %hs {%[ssl c verify],
%{+Q}[ssl c s dn],%{+Q}[ssl c i dn]} %{+Q}r
http-request set-header X-SSL %[ssl fc]
http-request set-header X-SSL-Client-Verify %[ssl c verify]
http-request set-header X-SSL-Client-DN %{+Q}[ssl c s dn]
http-request set-header X-SSL-Client-CN %{+Q}[ssl c s dn(cn)]
http-request set-header X-SSL-Issuer %{+Q}[ssl c i dn]
http-request set-header X-SSL-Client-NotBefore %{+Q}[ssl c notbefore]
http-request set-header X-SSL-Client-NotAfter %{+Q}[ssl c notafter]
default backend bk www
F5 Proxy:
Client CN can be passed in a HTTP header from the proxy to backend
server as shown below2.
1http://blog.haproxy.com/2013/06/13/ssl-client-certificate-information-in-http-
headers-and-logs/
2https://devcentral.f5.com/questions/client-certificate-pass-through
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# get the CN or user from the subject
set the user [findstr [lindex $the cert 2] ”CN=” 3 ”,”]
# copy the username to the header
HTTP::header insert SSL CLIENT USER $the user
Nginx reverse proxy:
To send the whole client certificate to backend server for validation, we
should add below configuration in the proxy3.
proxy set header X-SSL-CERT $ssl client cert;
3http://serverfault.com/questions/622855/nginx-proxy-to-back-end-with-ssl-client-
certificate-authentication
Appendix C
Snapshots of the MITM tool
The snapshots of the intercepted requests captured by the MITM tool are
shown below.
Figure C.1: MITM tool - Intercepted request from NSG
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Figure C.2: MITM tool - Intercepted response from proxy
